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ABSTRACT 
Numerous research groups are now utilizing Basic Formal 
Ontology (BFO) as an upper-level framework to assist in the 
organization and integration of biomedical information. This 
paper provides elucidation of the three BFO categories of 
function, role, and disposition, and considers two proposed 
sub-categories of artifactual function and biological function. 
The motivation is to help advance the coherent treatment of 
functions, roles, and dispositions, to help provide the poten-
tial for more detailed classification, and to shed light on 
BFO’s general structure and use. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Many of the members of the Open Biomedical Ontologies 
(OBO) Foundry initiative, including the Gene Ontology, the 
Foundational Model of Anatomy, the Protein Ontology, and 
the Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (http://www. 
obofoundry.org/) are utilizing Basic Formal Ontology 
(BFO) to assist in the categorization of entities and relation-
ships in their respective domains of research. 
 
             Fig. 1. The continuant categories of BFO. 
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Many individuals and groups involved in organizations 
such as BioPAX, Science Commons, Ontology Works, As-
traZeneca, and the Computer Task Group utilize BFO as 
well. 
            
               Fig. 2. The occurrent categories of BFO. 
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Versions of BFO in OBO, OWL and first-order logic formats are 
maintained by Holger Stenzhorn at http://www.ifomis.org/bfo. 
Definitions and other content taken from there have been mod-
ified to provide additional clarity of exposition. 
 
BFO is an upper-level ontology developed to support in-
tegration of data obtained through scientific research. It is 
deliberately designed to be very small, in order that is 
should be able to represent in consistent fashion the upper-
level categories common to domain ontologies developed by 
scientists in different domains and at different levels of gra-
nularity. BFO adopts a view of reality as comprising (1) 
continuants, entities that continue or persist through time, 
such as objects, qualities, and functions, and (2) occurrents, 
the events or happenings in which continuants participate. 
The subtypes of continuant and occurrent represented in 
BFO are presented in Figures 1 and 2 (Grenon and Smith, 
2004; Smith and Grenon, 2004; http://www.ifomis.uni-
saarland.de/bfo/). 
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2 FUNCTION, ROLE, AND DISPOSITION 
Use of the term ‘function’ is common in descriptions of 
molecular and cellular processes, as in assertions such as:  
• the function of the kidney of Mus musculus is to filter 
out waste and water which become urine, 
• Arabidopsis thaliana has a multifunctional protein 
• there are several folD bifunctional proteins in Campy-
lobacter jejuni. 
Functions thus play a central role in the Gene Ontology 
(http://www.geneontology.org/). 
What, however, of the non-biological functions of arti-
facts such as screwdrivers, microplates, or pycnometers? 
Are there both designed (artifactual) and natural (biological) 
functions, representing distinct subtypes of the more general 
category of BFO:function? 
A related issue is that of the use of the terms ‘function’ 
and ‘role’. These are distinguished by BFO as representing 
two distinct categories (Figure 1), but outside BFO circles 
they are often used interchangeably, as when function is 
defined as ‘the role that a structure plays in the processes of 
a living thing’. Analogous difficulties arise with regard to 
the terms ‘disposition’ and ‘tendency’, as in: ‘blood has the 
tendency or disposition to coagulate’, ‘a hemophiliac has the 
disposition or tendency to bleed an abnormally large amount 
of blood’, and ‘that patient has suicidal dispositions or ten-
dencies’. 
In this paper, we attempt to elucidate the categories of 
function, role, and disposition in BFO. We also describe two 
sub-type categories of function, the artifactual and the bio-
logical, and provide definitions for each. 
Within the context of BFO, one should correctly state: 
• the (or a) function of the heart is to pump blood  
• the role of the surrogate is to stand in for the patient 
• blood has the disposition to coagulate 
• that patient has suicidal tendencies 
To see why this is so, we need first to consider BFO’s more 
general approach to classification. 
In BFO, all entities are divided into continuants and oc-
currents; continuants in turn are divided into independent 
and dependent. Independent continuants are things (the ob-
jects we see around us every day) in which dependent conti-
nuants—such as qualities, functions, roles, dispositions—
can inhere.  
Dependent continuants stand to their bearers in the rela-
tion of existential dependence: in order for them to exist, 
some other (independent) entity must exist. For example, 
instances of qualities such as round and red are dependent 
continuants in that they cannot exist without being qualities 
of some independent continuant such as a ball or a clown’s 
nose. So too, functions, roles, and dispositions exist only 
insofar as they are functions, roles, and dispositions of some 
(one or more) independent continuant. The function of my 
heart is an instance of the BFO type function, and so also is 
the function of your heart. 
One major subcategory of dependent continuants in BFO 
is that of realizable entity. Realizable entities are defined by 
the fact that they can be realized (manifested, actualized, 
executed) in occurrents of corresponding sorts. Examples of 
realizable entity types include: the function of the liver to 
store glycogen, the role of being a doctor, the disposition of 
metal to conduct electricity. 
Realizable entities are entities of a type whose instances 
are typically such that in the course of their existence they 
contain periods of actualization, when they are manifested 
through processes in which their bearers participate. They 
may also exhibit periods of dormancy where they exist by 
inhering in their bearers, but are not manifested, as for ex-
ample, in the case of certain diseases. Some realizables, 
such as the function of a sperm to penetrate an ovum, may 
be such that they can be manifested only once in their life-
time; or, as again in the case of sperm, they are realized only 
in very rare cases.  
We are now in a position where we can define function, 
role, and disposition. 
 
2.1 Function 
A function f is 
(1) a realizable dependent continuant. 
Thus,  
(2) it has a bearer, which is an independent continuant, 
and 
(3) it is of a type instances of which typically have realiza-
tions; each realization is 
a. a process in which the bearer is participant 
b. that occurs in virtue of the bearer’s physical make-
up, 
c. and this physical make-up in something which that 
bearer possesses because of how it came into be-
ing. 
Examples include: the function of a birth canal to enable 
transport and the function of a hammer to drive in nails. The 
process under a. may be specified further as an end-directed 
activity, by which we mean in the biological case something 
like: an activity that helps to realize the characteristic physi-
ology and life pattern for an organism of the relevant type. 
Each function has a bearer with a physical structure which, 
in the biological case, the bearer has naturally evolved to 
have (as in a hypothalamus secreting hormones) or, in the 
artifact case, the bearer has been constructed to have (as in 
an Erlenmeyer flask designed to hold liquid) (Ariew and 
Perlman, 2002). 
It is not accidental or arbitrary that a given eye has the 
function to see or that a given screwdriver have been de-
signed and constructed with the function: to fasten screws. 
Rather, these functions are integral to these entities in virtue 
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of the fact that the latter have evolved or been constructed to 
have a corresponding physical structure. 
If a continuant has a function, then it is built to exercise 
this function reliably on the basis of this physical structure. 
But again: a function is not in every case exercised or mani-
fested. Its bearer may be broken; it may never be in the right 
kind of context. Hence, when we say that a given structure 
is designed in such a way as to bring about a certain end 
reliably, then this reliability presupposes the fulfillment of 
certain conditions, for example of an environmental sort.  
On the level of instances, this can be stated as: if f is the 
function of c, then (in normal circumstances), c exercises f. 
On the level of universals, as: if F is the function univer-
sal exemplified by instances of the independent continuant 
universal C, then (in normal circumstances) instances of C 
participate in process instances which are realizations of F. 
The implications of this analysis for the treatment of func-
tions in the Gene Ontology are outlined in Hill, Smith, 
McAndrews-Hill, and Blake (2008). 
 
2.2 Role 
In contrast to function, role is a realizable entity whose ma-
nifestation brings about some result or end that is not typical 
of its bearer in virtue of the latter’s physical structure. Ra-
ther, the role is played by an instance of the corresponding 
kind of continuant entity because this entity is in some spe-
cial natural, social, or institutional set of circumstances 
(http://www.ifomis.org/bfo).  
Examples include: the role of a chemical compound to 
serve as analyte in an experiment, the role of penicillin in 
the treatment of a disease, the role of bacteria in causing 
infection, the role of a person as student or surgeon. 
What is crucial for understanding a role—as distinct from 
a function—is that it is a realizable entity that an indepen-
dent continuant can take on, but that it is not a reflection of 
the in-built physical structure of that independent conti-
nuant. Certain strains of Escherichia coli bacteria have the 
role of pathogen when introduced into the gut of an animal, 
but they do not have this role when merely floating around 
in a pool of water. A heart has the function of pumping 
blood; but in certain circumstances that same heart can play 
the role of dinner for the lion. 
Roles are optional, and they often involve social ascrip-
tion. This is why a person can play the role of being a law-
yer or a surrogate to a patient, but it is not necessary for 
persons that they be lawyers or surrogates. 
So, when researchers are considering whether some rea-
lizable entity is a function or a role, the question to ask is 
this: Is the realizable entity such that its typical manifesta-
tions are based upon its physical structure? If so, then it is a 
function. Or, is the realizable entity such that its typical ma-
nifestation is a reflection of surrounding circumstances, es-
pecially those involving social ascription, which are option-
al? If so, then it is a role. 
From this perspective, it is incorrect to make assertions 
such as: 
• the role of the heart is to pump blood; 
• driving nails is a role that this hammer fulfills; 
• the function of the surrogate is to stand in for the pa-
tient; 
• the function of James is to serve as my servant. 
 
2.3 Disposition versus Tendency 
It is common to find researchers making claims like: ‘water 
has the disposition to rise in a tube’, ‘Carbon-10 has a dis-
position to decay to Boron-10’, and ‘the cell wall is dis-
posed to filter chemicals in endocitosis and exocitosis.’ A 
disposition is a realizable dependent continuant that typical-
ly causes a specific process in the object in which it inheres 
when the object is introduced into certain specific circums-
tances. In addition, these processes occur as a result of the 
object’s physical structure (Jansen, 2007). 
A disposition invariably leads to a certain result given 
certain circumstances. Consider: the disposition of a car 
windshield to break if struck with a sledgehammer moving 
at 100 feet per second; the disposition of a cell to become 
diploid following mitosis; the disposition of a magnet to 
produce an electrical field. 
Contrasted with a disposition is a tendency, which is a 
realizable dependent continuant that potentially (not invari-
ably or definitely) causes a specific process in the object in 
which it inheres when the object is introduced into certain 
specific circumstances as a result of the object’s physical 
structure property. 
Examples include: the tendency on the part of a hemophi-
liac to bleed an abnormally large amounts of blood and the 
tendency on the part of a person who smokes two packs of 
cigarettes a day throughout adulthood to die of a disease at a 
below average age. A patient may have a tendency, and not 
a disposition, to commit suicide; while a crystal vase has a 
disposition, and not a tendency, to break when it hits the 
ground after being dropped from a tall building. We are 
referring to tendencies when we refer to genetic and other 
risk factors for specific diseases. 
 
3 TWO SUB-CATEGORIES OF FUNCTION 
It is possible that BFO has failed to recognize categories or 
sub-categories of entities existing in reality. The ontology is, 
however, developed on the basis of a principle of scientific 
fallibilism (Grenon and Smith, 2004). Thus, it is possible 
that future research in ontology or in the natural sciences 
will reveal the need for an expansion or restructuring of the 
categories that BFO recognizes. 
In its present form, BFO categories are those included in 
the taxonomic hierarchy illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 
above. However, we are exploring the possibility of intro-
ducing two sub-categories under function, namely artifac-
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4 
tual function and biological function, as illustrated in Figure 
3. 
We are also exploring the question of whether to include 
tendency as a further sub-category within the ontology. 
 
     Fig. 3. Two proposed sub-categories of function in BFO. 
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3.1 Artifactual Function 
An artifactual function is a function which inheres in an 
independent continuant that exists, and has the physical 
structure which it has, because it has been designed and 
made intentionally (typically by one or more human beings) 
to function in a certain way and does indeed reliably func-
tion in this way (Lind, 1994; Dipert, 1993). 
Examples include: the function of a pycnometer to hold 
liquid, the function of a fan to circulate air, and the function 
of a Bunsen burner to produce a flame. 
 
3.2 Biological Function 
A biological function is a function which inheres in an inde-
pendent continuant that is (i) part of an organism and (ii) 
exists and has the physical structure it has as a result of the 
coordinated expression of that organism’s structural genes 
(Rosse and Mejino, 2003). The manifestations of a function 
of this sort form part of the life of the organism. 
Examples include: the function of a mitochondrion in the 
production of ATP and the function of the wax-producing 
mirror gland of the worker honey bee to produce beeswax. 
The manifestations of biological functions are not in 
every case beneficial to the survival of the corresponding 
organism. (Consider the case of organisms that die when 
they reproduce, like Arabis laevigata and Octopus lutens.) 
Rather, they are (in typical environments) such as to contri-
bute to the realization by an organism of a life that is typical 
or characteristic for an organism of its kind. 
It is an open question whether the dichotomy between bi-
ological and artifactual function should or should not be 
included as an addition to BFO, or reflected rather in the 
creation of two new domain ontologies of artifactual and of 
biological functions. The latter has already been proposed as 
a complement to the GO’s molecular function and biologi-
cal process ontologies. 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We wish to thank Andrew Spear for helpful comments. This 
work is funded by the United States National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) through the NIH Roadmap for Medical Re-
search, Grant 1 U54 HG004028. 
 
REFERENCES 
Allen, C., Bekoff, M., and Lauder, G., eds. (1998) Nature’s Pur-
poses: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Ariew, A. and Perlman, M. (2002) Introduction. In A. Ariew, R. 
Cummins, and M. Perlman, eds., Functions: New Essays in the 
Philosophy of Psychology and Biology (pp. 1–7). Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York. 
Arp, R. (2006) Evolution and two popular proposals for the 
definition of function. Journal for General Philosophy of 
Science, 37, 2–12. 
Dipert, R. (1993) Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency. Temple Uni-
versity Press, Philadelphia. 
Grenon, P. and Smith, B. (2004) SNAP and SPAN: Towards dy-
namic spatial ontology. Spatial Cognition and Computation, 4, 
99–104. 
Hill, D., Smith, B., McAndrews-Hill, M., and Blake, J. (2008) 
Gene Ontology annotations: What they mean and where they 
come from. BMC Bioinformatics, 9, S2. 
Hunter, L. (2009) An Introduction to Molecular Biology for Com-
puter Scientists. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. In preparation. 
Jansen, L. (2007) Tendencies and other realizables in medical in-
formation sciences. Available at: http://ontology.buffalo.edu/ 
bfo/Tendencies.pdf. 
Lind, M. (1994) Modeling goals and functions of complex indus-
trial plants. Applied Artificial Intelligence, 8, 259–283. 
Perlman, M. (2004) The modern philosophical resurrection of tele-
ology. The Monist, 87, 3–51. 
Rosse, C. and Mejino, J. (2003) A reference ontology for bioin-
formatics: The Foundational Model of Anatomy. Journal of 
Biomedical Informatics, 36, 478–500.  
Smith, B. and Grenon, P. (2004) The cornucopia of formal-
ontological relations. Dialectica, 58, 279–296. 
Smith, B., Kusnierczyk, W., Schober, D., and Ceusters, W. (2006) 
Towards a reference terminology for ontology research and 
development in the biomedical domain. Proceedings of KR-
MED, 1, 1–10. 
Smith et al. (2007) The OBO Foundry: Coordinated evolution of 
ontologies to support biomedical data integration. Nature Bio-
technology, 25, 1251–1255. 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.1
94
1.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
2 
Ju
n 
20
08
